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NOTE
MAY v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO.:
"KNOW YOUR LIABILITY LIMITS"
I. INTRODUCTION
Uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage-what is it and what is its purpose?
UM coverage is intended to protect the injured in the event he or she is in-
volved in an accident with an uninsured driver. State legislatures addressed the
problem of uninsured motorists by enacting statutes requiring insurers to offer
insureds UM coverage. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that "the intent
of the uninsured motorist legislation is to afford to one insured under his own
liability insurance policy the same protection in the event he is injured by an
uninsured motorist as he would have had if the negligent motorist had carried
liability insurance."'
The UM statute in Oklahoma is title 36, section 3636.2 The statute ad-
1. May v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 43, 46 (Okla. 1996).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (Supp. 1996) states:
(A). No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be
issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or
Principally garaged in this state unless the policy includes the coverage described in subsection B of
ts section. (B). The policy referred to in subsection A of this section shall provide coverage therein
or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehi-
cles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom. Coverage shall
be not less than the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a policy meeting the
requirements of Section 7-204 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes; ... provided, however, that
increased limits of liability shall be offered and purchased if desired, not to exceed the limits provid-
ed in the policy of bodily injury liability of the insured. The uninsured motorist coverage shall be
upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner .... (F). A named insured or applicant shall
have the right to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing, and except that unless a named in-
sured or applicant requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or sup-
plemental to any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended or replacement policy where a named
insured or applicant had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him
by the same insurer. (G). Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the following are the only
instances in which a new form affecting uninsured motorist coverage shall be required: 1. When an
insurer is notified of a change in or an additional named insured; 2. When there is an additional
vehicle that is not a replacement vehicle; provided, a new form shall not be required for the addition,
substitution or deletion of a vehicle from a commercial automobile liability policy covering a fleet of
five (5) or more vehicles; or 3. When the amount of bodily injury liability coverage is amended.
Provided, any change in premium alone shall not require the issuance of a new form.... (H). The
offer of the coverage required by subsection B of this section shall be in the following form which
shall be filed with and approved by the Insurance Commissioner. The form shall be provided to the
proposed insured in writing separately from the application and shall read as follows:
OKLAHOMA UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE LAW
Oklahoma law gives you the right to buy Uninsured Motorist coverage in the same amount as your
bodily injury liability coverage. THE LAW REQUIRES US TO ADVISE YOU OF THIS VALU-
1
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dresses several issues relating to UM coverage. For example, section 3636(A)
requires that UM coverage be offered with the issuance of each insurance poli-
cy? The statute does give the insured the right to, in writing, reject the UM
coverage.' However, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated:
In... § 3636(F), the Legislature has set forth a narrow pronouncement
which relieves insurers from the burden of procuring a written rejection of
uninsured motorist coverage whenever an existing policy is renewed. This
pronouncement, however, must be viewed in the context of the explicitly
announced legislative policy set forth at... § 3636(A) which is that unin-
sured motorist coverage must be offered with each policy of insurance. To
give full effect to the overall policy of section 3636 the provision of sub-
section (F) must be viewed as strictly limited to true renewals of existing
insurance policies, that is, situations where such renewals are made with-
out effecting a material change or departure from the provisions of the
original policy.5
Thus, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that an insurer's "failure to offer
uninsured motorist coverage [when a new policy is issued or when there is a
material change in an existing policy, along with a] failure to obtain a written
rejection required by... § 3636(F), result[s] in the inclusion of uninsured mo-
torist coverage as part of the policy by operation of law."6
Once it has been determined that UM coverage will be imputed into the
policy, the question arises as to what the UM limits are. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma addressed this issue in May v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.'
Imputing the statutory minimum of liability coverage' as the limit for the im-
puted UM policy coverage-as the court held in May-has positive implica-
tions. Moreover, it is logical and just according to the rationale behind UM
coverage and the language of section 3636.
ABLE RIGHT FOR THE PROTECTION OF YOU, MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY, AND OTHER
PEOPLE WHO MAY BE HURT WHILE RIDING IN YOUR INSURED VEHICLE. YOU SHOULD
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER BUYING THIS COVERAGE IN THE SAME AMOUNT AS YOUR
LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE LIM .... THE COST OF THIS COVERAGE IS
SMALL COMPARED WITH THE BENEFITS!
3. See id. § 3636(A).
4. See id. § 3636(F).
5. Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673, 676 (Okla. 1987).
6. Id.
7. 918 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a ques-
tion of state law to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma pursuant to the Oklahoma Uniform Certification of Ques-
tions of State Law Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1611 (1991), asking the Court to address the issue. See
i. at 43-44. The posed question was: "Given that uninsured motorist coverage is imputed to the policy at
issue as a matter of law according to the facts presented below, what are the limits of the imputed coverage
under Okla. Stat. tit. 36 § 3636 as amended September 1990?" Id. at 44.
8. Oklahoma law mandates that the minimum liability limit is $10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00
per occurrence. See OKLA. STAT. tit 47, §7-204 (1991).
[V/ol. 32:801
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
May v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. arose from a car accident that
occurred in September of 1991.9 "[An automobile operated by an intoxicated
driver'" struck an automobile occupied by Timothy May and Jesse Worsham,
killing May and seriously injuring Worsham."" May and Worsham were hit
by the drunk driver while working for Gold Bond Building Products, acting
within the scope of their employment, and driving a company car. 2 The su-
preme court stated that Gold Bond Building Products was legally the same
entity as National Gypsum. 3 Therefore, the insurance policy issued to National
Gypsum is the policy at issue in the case.'4
In January 1988, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania ("National Union") issued a business automobile liability policy'5
to National Gypsum, and in March of that year, a valid written rejection of UM
coverage was signed by National Gypsum's Director of Risk Insurance.'6 The
"rejection corresponded with National Gypsum's and National Union's intent
throughout the time period relevant to this case that the policy not include UM
coverage."' 7
National Union renewed the policy yearly to National Gypsum. January
1, 1989, National Gypsum lowered their liability limits from $5,000,000.00 to
$3,000,000.00 when the policy was reissued. 9 The supreme court found this
change to be a "material change in or departure from the provisions of the
[original] policy.""w Once there is a material change in the original policy, the
9. See May, 918 P.2d at 44.
10. "The intoxicated driver carried liability insurance at the statutory minimum under Oklahoma
Law-10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00 per occurrence. The Worshams' and Mays' losses exceeded that
coverage, and that policy is not at issue in this case." Id. at 44 n.l.
11. Id. at 44.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. According to the unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
May v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,
[tihe policy limited payment under the uninsured motorist coverage as follows:
LIMITS OF PAYMENT
AMOUNTS PAYABLE OF UNINSURED MOTORISTS LOSSES
Our obligation to pay uninsured motorists losses is limited to the amounts per person and per
occurrence stated in the attached Declarations. The following conditions apply to these lim-
its: 1. Bodily injury limits shown for any one person, multiplied by the number of premiums
shown, are for all legal damages, including care or loss of services, claimed by anyone for
bodily injury to one person as a result of one occurrence. Subject to this limit for any one
person, the total limit of our liability shown for reach occurrence, multiplied by the number
of premiums shown, is for all damages, including care or loss of services, due to bodily
injury to two or more persons in any one occurrence.
May v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 93-5220, 1994 WL 584577, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 25, 1994).




19. Id. The policy's liability coverage remained at $3,000,000.00 through the date of the automobile
accident involving May and Worsham. See id.
20. Id. See Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673, 676 (Okla. 1987); see also OKLA.
3
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insurer must offer the insured a new form, regarding uninsured motorist cover-
age, to be signed. In Oklahoma a material change occurs when the amount of
bodily injury liability coverage is amended.2' The relevant Oklahoma statute
lists three instances, including a change in the amount of bodily injury cover-
age, where the insurer is required to offer the insured a new form.' The su-
preme court stated that "National Union did not re-offer National Gypsum UM
coverage, nor did it obtain a written rejection from National Gypsum declining
such coverage. Therefore, by operation of Oklahoma law, UM coverage was
imputed to the policy as of January 1, 1989. ''"
The Mays and Worshams, as beneficiaries of the insurance policy, sued
arguing that the amount of UM coverage imputed into the policy should equal
the amount of the policy's liability limits, $3,000,000.00.24 National Union's
position was that the imputed UM limits should equal the Oklahoma statutory
minimum for UM coverage--$10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00 per acci-
dent.26
I. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. Statutory Law
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in May determined that the 1990 amend-
ed version of section 363627 applied in the case.'s "In 1990, the Oklahoma
STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(G)(3) (Supp. 1996).
21. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(G)(3) (Supp. 1996).
22. Section 3636(G) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the following are the only instances in which a new
form affecting uninsured motorist coverage shall be required: 1. When an insurer is notified of a
change in or an addition of a named insured; 2. When there is an additional vehicle that is not a
replacement vehicle; provided, a new form shall not be required for the addition, substitution or dele-
tion of a vehicle from a commercial automobile liability policy covering a fleet of five (5) or more
vehicles; or 3. When the amount of bodily injury liability coverage is amended. Provided, any change
in premium alone shall not require the issuance of a new form.
Id.
23. See May, 918 P.2d at 44. "At no time after the January 1989 renewal and up through the 1991 acci-
dent did National Union offer National Gypsum UM coverage or obtain from National Gypsum a rejection of
UM coverage. The policy was last renewed by National Gypsum on January 1, 1991." Id.
24. See id. at 45.
25. See id. "The district court ruled in favor of National Union. The case [was then appealed] to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit." Id.
26. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-204 (1991).
27. Prior to the 1990 changes, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma interpreted the statute as follows:
mhe intent of the uninsured motorist legislation is to afford to one insured under his own liability
insurance policy the same protection in the event he is injured by an uninsured motorist as he would
have had if the negligent motorist had carried liability insurance. In subsection (B) of section 3636, it
is provided that the uninsured motorist coverage provided as a part of a liability policy shall not be
less than that required under... § 7-204, with the insured to have the option to purchase increased
limits of liability not to exceed the limits provided for bodily injury liability under the policy. Section
7-204 sets the minimum limits of liability coverage required to be carried by all owners of vehicles
registered in the State of Oklahoma. The purpose of the uninsured motorist provision, when viewed
in light of the requirement that it provide minimum standards of protection, is that it place the in-
sured in the same position he would have been in if the negligent uninsured motorist had complied
with Oklahoma laws concerning financial responsibility.
Moser v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 406, 408 (Okla. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
28. See May, 918 P.2d at 45. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held that "[rnights of recovery under
4
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Legislature amended [section 3636]. Neither the pre-1990 version nor the
amended version of § 3636 prescrib[ed] how much coverage should be imputed
in the event an insurer does not satisfy the statute's requirements."29 The 1990
amendments to § 3636 added subsections (G), (H), and (I),30 but subsection
(H) is the relevant subsection in this case and is relied upon by the plaintiffs for
their position." The relevant parts of subsection (H) state:
The offer of the coverage required by subsection B of this section shall be
in the following form which shall be filed with and approved by the In-
surance Commissioner. The form shall be provided to the proposed in-
sured in writing separately from the application and shall read as follows:
OKLAHOMA UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE LAW
Oklahoma law gives you the right to buy Uninsured Motorist coverage in
the same amount as your bodily injury liability coverage. THE LAW
REQUIRES US TO ADVISE YOU OF THIS VALUABLE RIGHT FOR
THE PROTECTION OF YOU,... YOU SHOULD SERIOUSLY CON-
SIDER BUYING THIS COVERAGE IN THE SAME AMOUNT AS
YOUR LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMIT .... THE COST
OF THIS COVERAGE IS SMALL COMPARED WITH THE BENE-
FITS!32
The language in subsection (H) is strong and mandates specific action on behalf
of the insurer. The statute mandates the use of the form.
Prior to May, Oklahoma Statute title 47, § 7-204 ' established that the
statutory minimum of liability coverage would equal $10,000.00 per person and
$20,000.00 per accident.34 Currently, this amount remains as the minimum
liability coverage required by law.3
the Uninsured Motorist Act are governed by the statute in effect on the date of issuance or last renewal of the
policy against which an uninsured motorist claim is made." Cofer v. Morton, 784 P.2d 67, 70 (Okla. 1989).
Accord MeSorley v. Hertz Corp., 885 P.2d 1343, 1344 n.1 (Okla. 1994); Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662
P.2d 681, 684 n.2 (Okla. 1983). In the case at hand,
National Gypsum's policy was issued in 1988 and was renewed annually. The last renewal prior to
the September 1991 accident occurred on January 1, 1991. [The new] § 3636, which embraced the
1990 amendments, took effect on September 1, 1990 .... UM coverage was imputed to National
Gypsum's policy before the 1990 changes to § 3636. However, the plaintiffs' rights of recovery are
governed by the statute in effect on the date of the last renewal of that policy. The version of § 3636
in effect on the date of the policy's last renewal on January 1, 1991, was [the new] § 3636. Thus, the
amount of UM benefits the plaintiffs may recover under the policy is governed by the amended ver-
sion of the statute.
May, 918 P.2d at 45.
29. Id. (citation omitted); see Act of May 30, 1990, H.B. No. 2052, ch. 297, § 4, 1990 Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. (West) (effective Sept. 1, 1990).
30. The amendments of 1990 to § 3636 also made minor adjustments to subsections (B) and (F), but
those changes are not relevant to the issues in this case. See id. at 46.
31. See id.
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(H) (Supp. 1996).
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-204(a) (1991) states that
[n]o policy or bond shall be effective under Section 7-203 of this title unless issued by an insurance
company or surety company authorized to do business in this state, except as provided in subdivision
(b) of this section, nor unless such policy or bond is subject, if the accident has resulted in bodily
injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to
said limit for one person, to a limit of not less than Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) because
of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident ....
34. See id.
35. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-204 (1988).
1997]
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B. Case Law
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in a case decided in 1988, two years
before the 1990 amendments to section 3636, held that when UM coverage is
imputed into a policy it will be at the level of the statutory minimum rather
than the highest available limits of the policy.3 6 Thus, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma had addressed and decided the issue of the level of imputed UM
coverage before section 3636 was amended in 1990.' 7
The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma again addressed the issue regarding the
level of UM coverage that will be imputed into a policy as a matter of law, a
year and a half before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided May, but after
the 1990 amendments to section 3636."8 In Perkins v. Hartford Underwriters
Insurance Co., Edna Maxine Perkins was fatally injured in an automobile acci-
dent that occurred, as in May, in September of 1991."9 The court of appeals
held that UM coverage would be imputed into the Perkins' liability policy as a
matter of law.' Next, the court of appeals addressed the issue of what level
the UM coverage would be imputed into the policy.41 The court of appeals
analyzed the issue with respect to the 1990 amendments to section 3636. The
court stated that the statute "mandated insurance companies encourage their
insureds to purchase UM coverage up to the limits of liability [and] required
36. See Mann v. Farmers Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1988). In Mann, the Supreme Court stated that
[u]nder the construction adopted by the trial court, failure of the insurer to obtain a written rejection
as to the highest available limits would result in those limits being written into the uninsured motorist
provision of the insured's policy. This would result in the insured being placed in the position as
though an uninsured motorist, with whom the insured was involved in an accident, had purchased the
same liability policy as that purchased by the insured. As found in Moser this result goes beyond the
mandate of... § 3636.
Id. at 464. Mann, like May, involved a commercial fleet liability policy. See id. at 461.
37. See id. at 460. Justice Alma Wilson dissented in the opinion. In her published dissent, she disagreed
with the reasoning and result of the majority and stated she would "find that the appellees were covered by an
uninsured motorist provision in the amount of the policy, $250,000/$500,000." Id. at 470 (Alma Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
38. See Perkins v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1262 (Okla. CL App. 1994). Perkins was
decided October 25, 1994 and certiorari to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was denied January 18, 1995. See
id.
39. See id. at 1263.
40. See id.
Perkins and Decedent were the named insureds by Hartford under a policy for automobile insurance.
This policy provided $100,000.00 per person liability coverage on two motor vehicles and $15,000.00
per person uninsured motorist coverage (UM). In February 1991, a third automobile was insured
under the same policy and with the same limits of liability. In March 1991, one automobile was
deleted from the policy .... At no time did Hartford tender an offer to Perkins for UM coverage
equal to liability limits in the manner prescribed by... § 3636, effective September 1, 1990.
Id. at 1263. Hartford argued that
it was not required to tender an offer of the higher coverage and obtain a written rejection thereof
until the expiration of the one-year phasing in period specified by the statute. However,... § 3636
(G)(2) [specifically provided that a new form regarding UM coverage will be required when] an
additional vehicle that is not a replacement vehicle [is added to the policy.] The record reflects a
third, or additional, vehicle was added to the policy in February 1991. We therefore hold Hartford
was required but failed to tender the mandated statutory form affecting uninsured motorist coverage
to Perkins and obtain a written rejection thereof no later than February 1991.
Id. at 1264.
41. See id. at 1263.
6
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insurers to offer such coverage in a form specified by statute and to obtain a
written rejection of such coverage."'42
The court of appeals stated that
[t]he legislature is never presumed to have done a vain thing. It is the
duty of the courts to supply, by appropriate pronouncement, whatever
procedure may be necessary in order to implement a legislatively-designed
remedy that is found procedurally incomplete or deficient. Hartford, in
violation of... § 3636, failed to timely notify Perkins by the statutorily
mandated form of the option to obtain uninsured motorist coverage at
least equal to liability limits.'
Because the insurer had not validly received Perkins' rejection on the mandated
form, the court of appeals further held "that the limits of uninsured motorist
coverage in this case are defined by the maximum limits of the policy (liability
limits) rather than the minimum limits prescribed by statute or the amount of
[UM] coverage Perkins had previously obtained which was slightly in excess of
the statutory minimum."" Thus, Perkins received UM coverage in the amount
of $100,000.00, his policy's liability limits, rather than $10,000.00, the statutory
minimum.45
IV. DECISION OF THE CASE
In May the Supreme Court of Oklahoma overruled Perkins and held that
"[t]he amount of the imputed coverage is dictated by ... § 3636(B) and...
§ 7-204(a) and equals the statutory minimum of UM coverage prescribed by
law for public liability protection: $10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00 per
accident."' The court stated that in interpreting the language of the relevant
statutes it would follow the principle that "[t]he fundamental rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and
purpose of the Legislature as expressed in a statute," while considering all
relevant portions of a statute together as a whole.47 The comer stone of the
court's decision lay in the determination by the court, when reviewing title 36,
§ 3636 as a whole, that the addition of subsection (H), upon which the plain-
tiffs relied, did not point to a change in the "legislative intent previously as-
cribed to the statute."' The court specifically held that the "1990 amendments
did not alter in any significant respect the basic components of the statute .....
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1263-64 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 1264 (footnote omitted).
45. See id.
46. May v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 43, 48-49 (Okla. 1996).
47. Id. at 47 (citing Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverages Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 764 P.2d
172, 179 (Okla. 1988)).
48. Id.
49. Id. The court further stated that the "statute continues to require that every liability insurance policy
contain a provision for UM coverage, that UM coverage be offered in amounts between the statutory mini-
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The court reasoned that the addition of subsection (H) had two objec-
tives."0 The primary objective was to mandate the use of the standardized form
by every insurer when offering UM coverage." This objective was the
legislature's "response to the multitude of Oklahoma cases that addressed, under
a pre-1990 version of § 3636, insurers' failure to offer UM coverage or obtain
written rejection thereof."'52 The second purpose of the addition according to
the court was to encourage the insured, through the use of the form, to pur-
chase UM coverage equal to the liability limits. 3 The court emphasized that
the legislature intended to mandate the use of the form, but only to encourage
the purchase of UM coverage at the policy's liability limits." "Encouragement
and mandate are two entirely different things. Neither the pre-1990 nor amend-
ed versions of § 3636 dictate the result plaintiffs seek here." 5
Since the court determined that the legislature did not intend to change the
interpretation of section 3636 significantly, the court recited its interpretation of
the statute prior to the 1990 amendments stating that its earlier interpretation
still dictated today 6 Justice Opala, the author of the previous opinion, rea-
soned that the Financial Responsibility Act, section 7-204,
commands vehicle owners to maintain public liability protection,
while... [Oklahoma Statute title 36 § 3636] directs that, absent the
insured's written rejection, an automobile policy must include minimum
UM coverage. The lone, though doubtless the most revealing, nexus be-
tween the two enactments is found in the mention made in § 3636(B) of
the minimum amount of liability coverage that is mandated by the finan-
cial responsibility law. This reference plainly demonstrates a legislative
intent to confine the public policy mandate for the statutory UM coverage
level to no more than the minimum amount of insurance prescribed by
law for public liability protection."
Thus, the court held that
[w]here an insurer fails to offer in writing or obtain a written rejection of
UM coverage such that UM coverage is imputed to an insured's policy as
a matter of law, we hold that the mandate of § 3636 is satisfied by impu-
tation of the minimum limits of UM coverage required by statute. To
impute a higher amount of UM coverage of UM would go beyond the
mandate of § 3636.8
50. See id.
51. See id.





57. Id. at 47-48 (quoting State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Wendt, 708 P.2d 581, 588 (Okla.
1985) (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted)).
58. Id. at 48.
[Vol. 32:801
8
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The court held that when UM coverage is imputed into a policy by operation of
law, it must be at the statutorily prescribed minimum and not the bodily injury
liability limits.59
The court next addressed the contrary reasoning held by the Court of Ap-
peals of Oklahoma in Perkins.' The supreme court stated that the court of
appeals in Perkins "correctly noted that courts have a duty 'to supply, by appro-
priate pronouncement, whatever procedure may be necessary in order to imple-
ment a legislatively-designed remedy that is found procedurally incomplete or
deficient."'6 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, however, noted that the flaw
was in the court of appeals' reasoning that section 3636 contained a "legisla-
tively-designed remedy." 2 The only legislative mandate, as stated above, is for
insurers to use the standardized form when offering insureds UM coverage.63
In fact, the statute "has never prescribed the amount of UM coverage to be
imputed to a policy when an insurer fails to satisfy the statute's requirements.
The remedy of imputing UM coverage to an insurance policy where an insurer
has transgressed § 3636 was judicially crafted in an effort to fulfill legislative
intent. '6
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that the court of appeals
did not even consider the underlying purpose or legislative intent of section
3636 when it made its decision.' Thus, the court of appeals went beyond the
legislative mandate extended by section 36 36 .0 Therefore, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma's decision in May expressly overruled the holding of Perkins.67
V. ANALYSIS
A. Court's Use of Precedent and Policy
In May, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma first determined whether the
legislative intent of section 3636 was changed by the 1990 amendments to the
statute.' The court determined that the amendments did not change the legisla-
tive intent of the statute, but that the substance of the amendments did mandate
the use of a standardized form when offering insureds UM coverage, and the
59. See id. at 48-49.
60. See id. Perkins v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1262 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994), is the only
other decision by an Oklahoma court that has addressed the issue since the 1990 amendments. Id.






67. See id. The decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in May v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 918
P.2d 43 (Okla. 1996), answering the certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, was written by Justice Watt. Justice Lavender, Justice Simms, Justice Hargrave, Justice Opala, and
Justice Summers concurred. Justice Hodges concurred in the result. Vice Chief Justice Kauger concurred in
part and dissented in part, and Chief Justice Wilson dissented. The only published opinion was Justice Watt's
opinion. See id. at 49.
68. See id. at 47.
1997]
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substance of the amendments encouraged insureds to purchase UM coverage
equal to their liability limits. 69 Yet, the amendments did not amount to any
legislatively-designed remedy, as the only mandate was to use the standardized
form, and the statute still did not address at what level UM coverage would be
imputed into a policy as a matter of law.7" The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
took a step-by-step approach to answering the question and carefully analyzed
past precedent and legislative intent before making its ruling.
B. Implications of the Decision
The implication of the supreme court's decision will be far-reaching. The
decision dictates that when UM coverage is imputed into a policy because of a
failure by the insurer to follow the appropriate procedures in offering or obtain-
ing a rejection for UM coverage, the imputed level of coverage will be the
statutory minimum required in Oklahoma,7' $10,000.00 per person and
$20,000.00 per accident. It is relevant at this point to note that this will only
become an issue when one is involved in an accident where the person at fault
does not have insurance,' thus requiring the injured person to turn to his or
her own policy for UM coverage. If one is involved in an accident and the
person at fault does have the statutory minimum of insurance and this covers
the injured person's damages, then the injured will receive the statutory mini-
mum of liability insurance. Thus, the court's decision puts an injured person hit
by an uninsured motorist and an injured person hit by a person insured at the
statutory minimum, on even ground. This is both a logical and just result.
Moreover, if the court had allowed the UM coverage to be imputed into
the policy at the liability limits it would afford an injured person hit by an
uninsured motorist a windfall as compared to an injured person hit by a person
insured at the statutory minimum. In both situations the injured person could
have either intended to reject, and, in fact, rejected UM coverage, or the injured
person could have purchased UM coverage at the statutory minimum, but later
made some "material change" to the policy, and because the insurer did not
reaffirm their earlier intention, as a matter of law the UM coverage would be
imputed into the policy. For example, in Perkins the injured thought he had
purchased UM coverage for $15,000.00./ Yet, because of the insurer's failure
to acquire Perkins' reaffirmation of this intent with the standardized form, in
February of 1991, when Perkins added a third car to the policy (a "material
change") UM coverage was imputed into the policy. Thus, it can be argued that
69. See id.
70. See id. at 48.
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-204 (1991).
72. This could also occur if the insurance of the person who hit the injured person does not cover the
injured person's damages.
73. See Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673, 676 (Okla. 1987); see also OKLA.
STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (Supp. 1996).
74. See Perkins v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
[Vol. 32:801
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Perkins would receive a windfall if UM coverage was imputed into his policy
equal to his liability limits, $100,000.00.
A counterargument is that if UM coverage is imputed into the policy at the
statutory minimum instead of the policy limits, then it is the insurance company
that is receiving the windfall, and it is the insurance company rather than the
injured insured who is better able to protect itself and bear the burden. The
insurer can avoid any imputation of UM coverage simply by following the
requirements of section 3636. This argument has validity, but it is not as strong
in the situation, such as with Perkins, when the insured's clear intention is to
reject UM coverage or purchase it at a level lower than the policy limits, yet
because of error on the part of the insurer, this is not validly accomplished
according to the procedure required by section 3636.
A positive effect of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's decision in May is
the "bright line" nature of the principle laid down in that decision. As a result
of the decision, when UM coverage is imputed into a policy as a matter of law,
it will be at the minimum level of coverage prescribed by statute rather than the
policy's liability limits. Thus, this amount is the same for every insured who
has UM coverage imputed into their policy. Since the minimum level is pre-
scribed by the statute, the principle of May will undoubtedly reduce the number
of lawsuits instituted by insureds, mainly declaratory judgment actions that seek
to have a court determine both the level of their bodily injury policy limits and
the level for UM coverage to be imputed into their policies.
Another positive effect of the decision in May is that insurance companies
will have less liability if a court finds that UM coverage should be imputed into
a policy as a matter of law because the UM coverage will be imputed into the
policy at the statutory minimum level rather than the bodily injury liability
limits. Therefore, insurers can pass the savings from lower risks of liability on
to their insureds in the form of less expensive insurance.
C. How other States Have Addressed the Issue
1. Imputed UM 7' Coverage at Liability Limits Based on Statutory
Mandate
A very recent case decided by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 6
75. Some of the cases discussed concern underinsured motorist ('UIM") coverage rather than UM cover-
age. The cases involving UIM coverage are relevant to May because courts use the same analysis for both
UM and UIM cases. Therefore, other than to note whether a case concerns UM or UIM coverage, no other
distinction is made in the analysis of the case.
76. Martin v. Continental Ins. Co., 474 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). This case, like May, involved
an employee injured while driving a company car in the course of business and, therefore, also involved the
company's insurance policy. See id. at 147.
At the moment of collision, plaintiff Martin was operating a vehicle owned by her employer, Caroli-
na Telephone and Telegraph Company (Carolina Telephone). The Carolina Telephone automobile
was insured for damages up to $1,000,000.00 per accident under a policy issued by Continental ....
Prior to trial, defendant, Continental moved for summary judgment on the issue of its potential liabil-
ity to Martin for UIM and/or uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. At a pretrial hearing on defendant's
motion, Judge W. Russel Duke, Jr., determined that Continental was not liable, and granted summary
judgment in its favor on the issue .... The remaining issue, and the genesis of this appeal, is wheth-
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held that when UM coverage is imputed into a policy, the imputed level is the
policy limits for the bodily injury coverage.' This case can be distinguished
from May because the applicable North Carolina statute78 mandates this result.
The North Carolina statute specifically states that "[i]f the named insured does
not reject underinsured motorist coverage and does not select different coverage
limits, the amount of underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the high-
est limit of bodily injury liability coverage for any one vehicle in the policy."79
By using "shall" in the statute, the legislature indicates that imputing coverage
into a policy at the policy injury liabilities limits is required.' The Oklahoma
legislature, on the contrary, has not stated that UM coverage must be imputed
into a policy at the policy's bodily injury liability limits.8'
Likewise, another recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Indiana held
that the UM coverage to be imputed into the automobile insurance policy shall
be equal to the policy's bodily injury liability limits.' The Court of Appeals
of Indiana in Skrzypczak v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. stated
that since State Farm did not obtain a rejection of uninsured motorist ("UIM")
coverage as required by statute when a new policy' was issued to the
Skrzypczaks, "they were required to provide the Skrzypczaks with [UIM] ...
coverage equal to their bodily injury liability limits of $100,000.00 per person
and $300,000.00 per accident for the accident of October 1, 1993.""4
er summary judgment was properly granted to Continental extricating it from UIM coverage liability
on the judgment.
Id.
77. See id. at 152. "Defendant acknowledges that the rejection language used in the United Telecom-
munication policy was not 'on a form promulgated by the North Carolina Rate Bureau."' Id. at 150. The court
of appeals went on to state that in Hendrickson v. Lee, 459 S.E.2d 275, 279, 283 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), that in
order to reject UIM coverage it must be done "in writing... on a form promulgated by the North Carolina
Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance .... [in an effort to] assure compensation of the
innocent victims of uninsured or underinsured drivers" and that this requirement would be strictly enforced.
Martin, 474 S.E.2d at 150.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1995).
79. Id. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
80. See id.
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (1996).
82. See Skrzypczak v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996).
On October 1, 1993, Ewa was driving, and Michal was a passenger, in their 1988 Mercury Tracer
when they were involved in an accident. The driver of the other vehicle was at fault, and was under-
insured thereby not fully compensating the Skrzypczaks for their damages. The Skrzypczaks had an
automobile insurance policy with Mutual for the Tracer .... On March 9, 1990, Ewa signed a rein-
statement of insurance application through Casualty that indicated a selection was made for no under-
insured motorist coverage for the Tracer. On November 9, 1990, State Farm replaced the Tracer's
Casualty insurance policy with a Mutual insurance policy. This Mutual insurance policy was in effect
at the time of the accident. Mutual does not have a rejection of underinsured motorist coverage spe-
cifically for the Tracer signed by either of the Skrzypczaks.
Id. at 292-93. Thus, since the insurer did not acquire a valid rejection of the UM coverage when the new
policy was issued by Mutual, a material change, the UM coverage was imputed into the Skrzypczaks' policy.
See id. at 295.
83. The court held that the policy issued to the Skrzypezaks on November 9, 1990, was not a "renewal"
policy according to the statutory definition of renewal, from Indiana Code section 27-7-6-3, but "was a new
policy within the meaning of Indiana Code section 27-7-5-2." See id. at 295.
84. Id.
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The Indiana legislature, like the North Carolina legislature, has mandated
that the UM coverage be equal to the bodily injury limits." The applicable
statute of Indiana provides that "[tihe uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage must be provided by insurers for either a single premium or for sepa-
rate premiums, in limits at least equal to the limits of liability specified in the
bodily injury liability provisions of an insured's policy, unless such coverage
have been rejected in writing by the insured."86 Therefore, Indiana mandates
by statute, like North Carolina, that UM coverage must equal the bodily injury
limits when it is imputed into a policy.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also recently addressed the issue of the
level of UM coverage to be imputed into a policyY Following the Louisiana
Revised Statutes, the Supreme Court of Louisiana quoted the relevant portion
stating that the statute
requires that an insurance policy provide UM coverage "in not less than
the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy... however,
the coverage required under this Subsection shall not be applicable where
any insured named in the policy shall reject in writing, as provided herein,
the coverage or select lower limits."'
The Supreme Court of Louisiana further held that "[tihis statute mandates that,
in the absence of a valid written rejection or selection of lower limits, UM
coverage is equal to the amount of liability coverage." '89 Therefore, the bodily
injury liability limit is the level for imputed UM coverage as a result of the
clear statutory mandate, because that is the norm according to the Louisiana
statute.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Alaska in a recent case held that if UM
coverage is imputed into a policy it will be equal to the policy's bodily injury
liability limits. 9 The court stated that "[n]o waivers were given in this case
[and] [w]here required coverage is not waived it must be provided. If a policy
does not provide the required coverage it will be reformed to conform with
statutory requirements."' Alaska's statute regarding UM coverage states that
unless the coverage is properly waived by the insured, the UM coverage's "pol-
icy limits [are] equal to the limits voluntarily purchased to cover the liability of
the person insured for bodily injury or death." Thus, the statute dictates that
the UM coverage will equal the policy's bodily injury limits.
85. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-2(2) (Michie 1994).
86. Id. The statute also provides that UM coverage, if not rejected, can not be less than $50,000.00.
Therefore, if the bodily injury limits are less than $50,000.00 the UM coverage must still equal at a minimum
$50,000.00, unless the coverage is rejected in writing by the named insured of the policy. Id.
87. See Martin v. Champion Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 991 (La. 1995).
88. See id. at 994 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) (West 1995)).
89. See id. This conclusion in Martin has been upheld, even more recently, by the Court of Appeals of
Louisiana in Herman v. Rome, 668 So. 2d 1202, 1207 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
90. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 918 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Alaska 1996).
91. Id.
92. ALAsKA STAT. § 21.89.020(c)(1) (Michie 1996).
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Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that UM coverage will be
imputed into a policy at the bodily injury liability limits.93 The court relied
upon the language in Arizona's Revised Statutes Section 20-259.01 (A):
Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability poli-
cies shall make available to the named insured thereunder and by written
notice offer the insured and at the request of the insured shall include
within the policy uninsured motorist coverage which extends to and cov-
ers all persons insured under the policy, in limits not less than the liability
limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy."
The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that there was an insufficient offer of
UM coverage therefore, "the proper remedy for a legally insufficient offer is to
include the coverage in the policy by operation of law."95 The court further
held that "the insured is entitled to coverage in the amount equal to the bodily
injury liability limits of the policy."' Therefore, Arizona answers the ques-
tion-as North Carolina, Indiana, Louisiana, and Alaska-relying upon clear
statutory language and, thus, a legislative mandate.
The Court of Appeals of Washington held that UIM coverage imputed into
a policy will be at the level of the policy's coverage limits." The relevant
UIM statute of Washington states that "coverage required under subsection (2)
of this section shall be in the same amount as the insured's third party liability
coverage unless the insured rejects all or part of the coverage." 98 The statute
explicitly mandates that UIM coverage equal the liability limits unless the in-
sured rejects all or part of the coverage. Therefore, it logically follows that
when UIM coverage is imputed into a policy as a matter of law it would also
93. See Tallent v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 612 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). The Supreme Court of Arizo-
na vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Arizona in Tallent v. National General Insurance Co., 915
P.2d 665, 667 (Ariz. 1996), and remanded the case to the trial court. The Supreme Court of Arizona did not
address the issue of the level of imputation of UM coverage since the court held that the offer of the insurer
by the form was not deficient. See id. at 667. Therefore, there would be no reason to impute UM coverage
into the policy. The Supreme Court of Arizona did not comment on the court of appeals' decision with regard
to this issue. See id.
94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(A) (1996). The language quoted from the subsection is almost
identical with the language quoted above for LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406(D) (West 1995).
95. Tallent, 903 P.2d at 618.
96. Id.
97. See Corley v. Hertz Corp., 887 P.2d 401, 405 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
In February 1991, Melvin Corley sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident which occurred
in King County. Corley was driving an automobile he had rented in Spokane from H.A.S. Corpo-
ration, a licensee of Hertz Corporation. The automobile was registered and licensed in Washington,
Corley was a resident of Colorado .... The rental agreement between Hertz and Corley contained
the following provision: ... "For bodily injury and property damage the limits of this protection,
including owner's liability, are the same as the minimum limits required by the automobile financial
responsibility law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred ..... This will conform to the
basic requirements of any applicable 'No Fault' law BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE 'UNINSURED
MOTORIST,' 'UNDERINSURED MOTORIST,' 'SUPPLEMENTARY NO FAULT' OR ANY OTH-
ER OPTIONAL COVERAGE. TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW HERTZ AND YOU
HEREBY REJECT THE INCLUSION OF ANY SUCH COVERAGE. In the event that any such
coverage is imposed by operation of law, then the limits of such coverage will be the minimum re-
quired by law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred."
Id. at 402-03. The insurance policy at issue had bodily injury limits of $500,000.00. See id. at 403. Therefore,
"Corley filed an action in Washington against Hertz seeking a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to
UIM coverage of at least $500,000 under the rental agreement." Id at 401.
98. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.22.030(3) (1996).
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be equal to the liability limits since it is imputed for lack of a valid rejection.
Thus, the Washington Court of Appeals' decision, like the decisions from the
courts in North Carolina, Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, and Arizona, rationally
follows the relevant statutory language holding contrary to the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma's decision in May.
The Ohio Court of Appeals in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Kammeyer,9 held that "UM coverage in an amount equivalent to automobile
liability coverage [is] the norm."'' The applicable statute states:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance...
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state... unless both of
the following coverage are provided to persons insured under the policy
for loss due to bodily injury or death suffered by such persons: (1) Unin-
sured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of coverage equiva-
lent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability cover-
age ....101
The statute is clear and unambiguous. The insured may reject or receive option-
al lesser amounts of UM coverage according to subsection (C) of the stat-
ute." If the insured does not reject the coverage or opt for lower coverage,
the statute mandates that UM coverage equal the liability limits of the poli-
cy. Since, absent valid rejection or lowering of the coverage, the norm is
for the UM coverage to equal the liability limits, it is logical for the UM cover-
age to equal the liability limits if the coverage arises by operation of law. Thus,
the court of appeals' decision"°4 to impute UM coverage into the policy in an
amount equal to the liability limits is solidly based on the statue's mandate.
Cases from North Carolina, Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Washing-
ton, and Ohio held that if UM coverage is imputed into a policy it must be at a
level equal to the liability limits of the policy."5 These conclusions, though,
are all rationally based upon the clear mandate of each jurisdictions applicable
statute. Therefore, these courts followed a legislative requirement when they
99. 646 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 3, 1990, David and Gene Kammeyer were returning from a job site in a truck owned by
their employer, Mack Iron Works, Inc. ("Mack Iron"), when another vehicle crossed into their lane,
striking them head-on. As a result of this collision, Gene Kammeyer was seriously injured; David
Kammeyer was killed. Because the amount of liability insurance on the tortfeasor's vehicle proved to
be insufficient to compensate them for their damages, appellants filed and underinsurance claim with
Mack Iron's insurer, appellee United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("USF&G"). Appellants
also sought underinsured motorists ("UM") coverage for damages arising from David Kammeyer's
death from their own insurer, appellee Nationwide Insurance Company ("Nationwide"). On June 19,
1992, appellee USF&G filed suit seeking a declaration that appellants were entitled to no more than
$25,000 pursuant to the terms of the policy it had issued to Mack Iron. On appellants' motion, appel-
lee Nationwide was joined as a party defendant. Following discovery, all parties moved for summary
judgment. The trial court denied appellants' motion, but it granted those motions filed by appellees. It
is from these judgments that appellants bring this appeal."
Id. at 245 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 248.
101. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
102. ILd. § 3937.18(C).
103. See id. § 3937.18(A)(1).
104. See Kammeyer, 646 N.E.2d at 248.
105. See supra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
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decided the issue. There is no statute in Oklahoma that is comparable to the
statutes the courts used in these cases to base their decisions upon.
2. Imputed UM Coverage at Liability Limits Not Mandated By Statute
The Court of Appeals of South Carolina-like courts in North Carolina,
Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Washington, and Ohio-held in Ackerman
v. Travelers Indemnity Co."°6 that when UIM coverage is imputed into an in-
surance policy, it will be imputed into the policy at the level of the bodily
injury liability coverage."° The South Carolina decision is different, though,
since there is no clear indication that South Carolina's applicable UIM statute
mandates this action."' The applicable statute does state that "[a]utomobile
insurance carriers shall offer, at the option of the insured, uninsured motorist
coverage up to the limits of the insured's liability coverage .... it"' The lan-
guage requires the insurer to offer UIM coverage up to the insured's liability
limits. This is very different from a mandate for the UJM coverage to be no
less than the liability limits (as the statutes mandate in North Carolina, Indiana,
Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Washington, and Ohio)."' Therefore, the court's
decision in Ackerman to impute UIM coverage into the policy at the liability
limits was not mandated by statute.
The Court Appeals of South Carolina did not give any particular line of
reasoning for its holding, stating only that if the insurer fails to prove that there
was an effective offer of UIM coverage to the insured, then there must be "ref-
ormation of the policy to include underinsured motorist coverage to the limits
of liability.' Moreover, the court failed to provide any policy rationale for
106. 456 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
107. See id. at 411. The facts of Ackerman are as follows:
Respondents, Norman D. Ackerman, Jr. and Jo Ann Ackerman (Ackermans), brought this suit for de-
claratory judgment and reformation of an automobile insurance policy against appellant, Travelers
Indemnity Company (Travelers). The Ackermans asked the court to reform the policy to include
underinsured motorist coverage up to the liability limits of the policy as a remedy for Travelers'
alleged failure to comply with S.C. Code of Laws § 38-77-160 (1976 as amended). This statute re-
quires automobile insurance carriers to offer their insureds optional underinsured motorist coverage
up to the limits of liability coverage.... The trial court held the policy must be reformed to provide
underinsured motorist coverage for the benefit of the Ackermans, and the amount of coverage should
extend to the full $500,000 liability limits.
Id. at 409. Travelers appealed, and the Court of Appeals of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision.
See id.
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law Co-op. 1989).
109. Id.
110. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law Co-op. 1989), with ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(c)(1-3)
(Michie 1996), and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(A) (1996), and IND. CODE § 27-7-6-3(2) (1994), and LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406(D) (West 1995), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1995), and OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Banks-Baldwin 1994), and WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030(3) (1996).
111. Ackerman v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 456 S.E.2d 408, 411 (S.C. CL App. 1995). The decision,
though, is a bit confusing because the court of appeals later in the Ackerman opinion stated that "the
Ackermans are therefore entitled to reformation of Exxon's policy to include underinsured motorist coverage
up to $500,000." See id. at 412 (emphasis added). The language used here indicates that UIM coverage must
not necessarily be imputed at the policy limits, but only up to the limits. The language is contrary to the lan-
guage used earlier in the opinion that indicated that UIM coverage would be imputed into the policy up to the
limits of liability. However, the court of appeals did affirm the trial court's decision to award the Ackermans
$500,000.00, the full liability limits of the policy. See id.
16
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its holding. Notwithstanding, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, without
statutory mandate, reached the same conclusion as courts in North Carolina,
Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Washington, and Ohio, and imputed UIM
coverage into the policy at the liability limits of the policy.
3. Imputed UM Coverage at the Statutory Minimum
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia took a contrary view to
the North Carolina, Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Washington, Ohio, and
South Carolina courts, yet the same as Oklahoma, holding that when UM cover-
age is imputed into a policy, it will be at the statutory minimum level."2 The
applicable statute of West Virginia provides:
Nor shall any such policy or contract be so issued or delivered unless it
shall contain an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured
all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall
be no less than the requirements of section two, article four, chapter sev-
enteen-d of this code'13 ... [and] such policy or contract shall provide
an option to the insured with appropriately adjusted premiums to pay the
insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured [or underinsured motor vehi-
cle] up to an amount... not less than limits of bodily injury liability
insurance .... "'
Thus, at a minimum, the statute mandates that UM coverage must be of-
fered at the statutory minimum, and the insured must be given the option to
purchase UM coverage up to the limits of the bodily injury liability insur-
ance."5 The language of the West Virginia statute is similar to the language
of Oklahoma Statute title 36, § 3636(B) because both require UM coverage to
be provided at a level not less than the statutorily prescribed minimum while
also giving insureds the option to purchase UM coverage in the same amount as
their policies' liability limits.
11 6
112. Cox v. Amick, 466 S.E.2d 459 (W.Va. 1995).
This action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on March 27, 1992, on U.S. Route
21 in Kanawha County when a vehicle driven by Brian Amick crossed the center line of the highway
and struck a vehicle driven by John Carl Cox head on. John Carl Cox was killed and his wife,
Glenna Griffith Cox, who was a passenger in the car, was seriously injured .... The two insurance
coverage issues relating to the car accident arose in a declaratory judgment action filed by the ap-
pellees in order to enforce uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage in a policy issued by Na-
tionwide to John Carl Cox, the decedent.
Id. at 462.
113. This section of the code sets out a statutory minimum for liability coverage. This statute is tiled the
"Proof of financial responsibility" construed. W. VA. CODE § 17D4-2 (1996).
114. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1996).
115. See id.
116. Compare W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1996), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(B), (H) (Supp. 1996).
It can be argued that the language in the Oklahoma statute is much stronger in encouraging insureds to pur-
chase UM coverage at the policy's liability limits as a result of the mandated form's language. Yet the lan-
guage of the form still qualifies only as an encouragement to purchase UM coverage at the policy's liability
limits, and not a mandate for such an action.
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The West Virginia court interpreted the statute's language as mandating
"that when an insurer fails to prove an effective offer and a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver by the insured, the insurer must provide the minimum coverage
required to be offered under the statute.""..7 Therefore, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held the same as the Supreme Court of Oklahoma on
the issue of the level of UM limits to be imputed into a policy as a matter of
law, basing its decision upon similar statutory language.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, like courts in West Virginia and Oklaho-
ma, held that when UIM coverage is implied by law, it will be limited to the
statutory minimum."' Arkansas' applicable statute states in part that:
No private passenger automobile liability insurance covering liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicles in
this state shall be delivered or issued in this state or issued as to any
private passenger automobile principally garaged in this state unless the
insured has the opportunity, which he may reject in writing, to purchase
underinsured motorist coverage .... Underinsured motorist coverage
shall be at least equal to the limits prescribed for bodily injury or death
under § 27-19-605."'
The limits mentioned in § 27-19-6052° require minimum liability limits of
$25,000 for bodily injury or death.' The Supreme Court of Arkansas rea-
soned that "the insurer is not required to offer anything more than the limits
listed in the statute, and to do otherwise would be to 'force upon the insurance
117. Cox v. Amick, 466 S.E.2d 459, 465 (W. Va. 1995). The court summarized the legislative intent
behind the statute.
mhe contents of the form described in this section which has been signed by any named insured
shall create a presumption that all named insureds under the policy received such an effective offer of
the optional coverage described in this section and that all such named insureds exercised a knowing
and intelligent election or rejection, as the case may be, of such offer as specified in the form. Such
election or rejection is binding on all persons insured under the policy.
Id. at 466.
118. See Ross v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 899 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Ark. 1995). In this case,
Carolyn Ross, appellant, was in a motor vehicle accident on March 24, 1992, involving another vehi-
cle operated by Michael Ceola. Ceola was apparentiy at fault. Ceola was insured with Liberty Mutual
Insurance which had a $25,000 liability limit available to Ross for the accident. Ross was insured at
the time by the United Services Automobile Association, appellee, under a single policy covering
four family vehicles with liability limits of $100,000 per person and uninsured motorist coverage of
$100,000 per person .... An informational form accompanying the policy and discussing underin-
sured motorist coverage provided that it was "optional but if ordered must equal your UM-BI limits,
is available in limits of $50,000/100,000 or above" .... There was no signed rejection for the cover-
age in this case so coverage was implied, and United does not dispute that matter. The point of con-
tention is how much coverage Ross would receive.
Id. at 54.
119. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-209(a)(1), (4) (Michie 1995).
120. Id. § 27-19-605(a) (Michie 1994) states in part:
No policy or bond shall be effective under § 27-19-604 unless issued by an insurance company or
surety company authorized to do business in this state, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, nor unless the policy or bond is subject, if the accident resulted in bodily injury or death, to
a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) be-
cause of bodily injury or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident and subject to said limit for
one (1) person, to a limit of not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) because of bodily injury or
death of two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident, and if the accident has resulted in injury to
or destruction of property, to a limit of not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) because of
injury to or destruction of property of others in any one (1) accident
Id.
121. See Ross, 889 S.W.2d at 55.
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company something that is not present in the statute."' "' The court further
reasoned that the Arkansas statute "clearly mandates that a minimum of
$25,000 underinsured coverage be offered and not an amount equal to the lia-
bility insurance purchased by the insured."' "sa Thus, Arkansas, West Virginia,
and Oklahoma courts held that when UM coverage is imputed into a policy, it
will be at the statutorily prescribed minimum level rather than the level of the
policy's bodily injury liability limits.
D. Oklahoma's Approach as Compared with the Other Jurisdictions
Of the ten jurisdictions previously mentioned,'24 (other than Oklahoma)
eight courts" held that when UM coverage is imputed into a policy by opera-
tion of law, it will be read into the policy at the bodily injury liability limits.
Out of these eight, seven of the courts' decisions" were based upon clear
statutory language. Oklahoma's applicable statute does not mandate that UM
coverage, if imputed into a policy, must equal the liability limits. The language
of the Oklahoma statute is similar to the language of the two jurisdictions'27
that held that when UM coverage is imputed into a policy, it should be at the
statutory minimum.
The Oklahoma, Arkansas and West Virginia courts follow the applicable
statutes, refusing to extend the limits beyond the legislative requirement."
The North Carolina, Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Washington, and Ohio
courts also follow the applicable statutes, yet have reached contrary results 2 29
The South Carolina court is the only court that goes beyond the language of the
applicable statute to determine the level of UIM coverage to be imputed into a
policy.'30 Thus, South Carolina is the only court, out of those discussed above,
that goes beyond the legislative mandate. All other state court's decisions dis-
cussed, although some had contrary results, did not go beyond the legislative
mandate of the statute to decide the issue.
Another question that arises as a result of this issue is whether insurance
premiums are less expensive or more expensive in a jurisdiction depending on
how the legislature or local court has answered the question of May. For exam-
122. See id. (quoting Jablonski v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 408 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1987)).
123. 1L
124. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Washington,
and West Virginia. See supra notes 75-123 and accompanying text.
125. Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Washington. See
supra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
126. Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington. See supra notes 75-105
and accompanying text.
127. Arkansas and West Virginia. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
128. See May v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1996); Ross v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 899 S.W.2d 53 (Ark. 1995); Cox v. Amick, 466 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1995).
129. See Martin v. Continental Ins. Co., 474 S.E.2d 146 (Ct. App. N.C. 1996); Skrzypczak v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 291 (Ind. CL App. 1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 918
P.2d 1022 (Alaska 1996); Martin v. Champion Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 991 (La. 1995); Tallent v. National Gen.
Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 665 (Ariz. 1996); Corley v. Hertz Corp., 887 P.2d 401 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Kammeyer, 646 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio 1994).
130. See Ackerman v. Travelers Indermn. Co., 456 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
1997]
19
Howard: May v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.: Know Your Liability Lim
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ple, in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and West Virginia, an insurance company will
have less liability if it makes a mistake and does not validly acquire a rejection
of UM coverage from its insured, causing the UM coverage to be imputed into
the policy as a matter of law.' In these three states, the imputed UM cover-
age will be equal to the statutory minimum rather than the policy's liability
limits, which could be a difference of hundreds of thousands or even millions
of dollars.
However, in North Carolina, Indiana, Louisiana, Alaska, Arizona, Wash-
ington, Ohio, and South Carolina, if the insurer makes a mistake and does not
acquire a valid rejection of UM coverage, the UM coverage will be imputed
into the policy at the policy's bodily injury liability limit.'32 The difference in
the insurer's liability may allow for a difference in the price of the insured's
policy, because the insurer may pass the higher risk of liability, and thus the
expense, on to the insured in the form of higher premiums. In short, insurers in
these states have higher liability risks with regards to UM coverage than insur-
ers in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and West Virginia.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in May v. National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co., methodically and conservatively looked at the precedent on the issue
regarding the level of imputation of UM coverage. In addition, the court deter-
mined the legislative intent of the 1990 amendments to Oklahoma Statute title
36, section 3636. The court's decision puts an injured person who is hit by an
uninsured motorist and an injured person who is hit by a motorist carrying
Oklahoma's statutory minimum, on even ground. From a policy standpoint, this
result is both logical and fair. Conversely, had the court imputed the UM cover-
age at the policy's liability limits, it would have afforded an injured person who
is hit by an uninsured motorist with a windfall, as compared with an injured
person who is hit by a motorist insured at Oklahoma's statutory liability limits.
The conclusion in May is favorable because it creates a "bright line" rule
that dictates the UM limits implied into a policy by law. Since that level is the
minimum prescribed by statute,' there will be few coverage disputes between
insureds and insurers on the level of UM coverage that will be imputed into
their policy as a matter of law. Therefore, this saves insureds both time and
litigation expenses, while relieving the courts of unnecessary coverage disputes.
131. See May v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1996); Ross v. United Serys. Auto.
Ass'n, 899 S.W.2d 53 (Ark. 1995); Cox v. Amick, 466 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1995).
132. See Martin v. Continental Ins. Co., 474 S.E.2d 146 (Ct. App. N.C. 1996); Skrzypczak v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 291 (Ind. CL App. 1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harington, 918
P.2d 1022 (Alaska 1996); Martin v. Champion Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 991 (La. 1995); Tallent v. National Gen.
Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 665 (Ariz. 1996); Corley v. Hertz Corp., 887 P.2d 401 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Ackerman
v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 456 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v.
Kammeyer, 646 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio 1994).
133. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-204 (1991).
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In the states that follow May, insurers will have less liability if UM cover-
age is imputed into the policy as a matter of law. In states that do not follow
May, if the insurer passes the cost of this higher liability on to the insured, then
insurance premiums will be higher. Thus, there is no reason, absent a legislative
mandate, for a court to hold that if UM coverage is imputed into a policy, it
should be at the policy's liability limits. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma's
decision in May v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. is logical and just ac-
cording to the rationale behind UM coverage and the language of section 3636.
Hillary E. Howard
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